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I.
Introduction
A reoccurring and divisive issue in the debate over food safety in the United 
States is whether the government should have the authority to order companies to recall 
unsafe food from commerce.2  Recent events have renewed interest in the debate: the 
discovery of the mad cow disease in Washington State, leading to the recall of beef 
products that may have been exposed to tissues containing the agent that causes bovine 
spongiform encephalopathy (BSE);3 well-publicized, large-scale recall failures,4 the 
threat of bioterrorism’s introducing harmful bacteria and toxins into the food chain;5 and, 
finally, an overall increasing concern about the safety of food in the United States.6
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2
 For example, on December 12, 2002, the United States Department of Agriculture Food Safety and 
Inspection Service held a public meeting on the topic of “Improving the Recall Process.”  The meeting 
included a lively discussion on the implications of mandatory recall authority.  Food Safety and Inspection 
Service (FSIS), Transcript of Proceedings:  Improving the Recall Process, Wash. D.C. (Dec. 12, 2002).  
3 See USDA Revises State Count on BSE Recall; Says More Than 500 Firms Have Been Notified, 6 FOOD 
CHEMICAL NEWS (2004) (describing how consumer groups are using the BSE incidents as another 
opportunity to call for mandatory recall).
4
 See, e.g., OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE, GREAT 
PLAINS REGIONAL AUDIT REPORT 24601-2-KC, FOOD SAFETY AND INSPECTION SERVICE OVERSIGHT OF 
PRODUCTION PROCESS AND RECALL AT CONAGRA PLANT (ESTABLISHMENT 969) (2003) (highly critical of 
government’s role in the recall of beef products in 2002 involving ConAgra).  
5
 See UNITED STATES GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, BIOTERRORISM: A THREAT TO AGRICULTURE AND 
THE FOOD SUPPLY (2003) (summary of threat of bioterrorism to United States food supply).
6
 For a recently published best-selling book criticizing the modern food industry and the overall safety of 
food, see ERIC SCHLOSSER, FAST FOOD NATION (2002).  For other similarly postured books, see MOLLY 
3Currently, the government does not have the authority to mandate a recall of unsafe food; 
recalls of unsafe food products are voluntarily conducted by food companies and are 
monitored by government agencies.7  This contrasts with the authority that government 
has to order a recall for many non-food products.8
Defenders of the current voluntary food recall system contend that the 
government has sufficient enforcement authority and that mandatory recall authority 
would undermine the cooperative arrangement that exists between government and 
private industry.9   Proponents of mandatory recall authority believe that the voluntary 
recall system does not meet the challenges and needs of the modern food production 
industry and that in order to protect public health, the government should be armed with 
mandatory recall authority such as it has for other non-food products.10  Defenders of the
current voluntary recall system include members and representatives of the food 
industry;11 supporters of a mandatory recall system include consumer advocacy groups12
and, interestingly enough, most recently the American Farm Bureau.13
IVINS, BUSHWACKED 125 –147 (2003); MARION NESTLE, SAFE FOOD: BACTERIA, BIOTECHNOLOGY, AND 
BIOTERRORISM (2003).
7 See GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO/RCED-00-195, FOOD SAFETY: ACTIONS NEEDED BY USDA 
AND FDA TO ENSURE THAT COMPANIES PROMPTLY CARRY OUT RECALLS (2000), at 3.
8 See, e.g., Consumer Protection Safety Act (CPSA) 15 U.S.C. § 2064 (1998) (empowering the Consumer 
Protection Safety Commission to order recalls of consumer products).
9 See FSIS Public Meeting, supra note 2, at 178-182, 190-201.
10 See, e.g., Caroline Smith DeWaal, Statement at the FSIS Public Meeting Improving the Recall Process, 
Wash. D.C. (Dec. 12, 2002).
11
 Notable food industry representatives supportive of the current voluntary recall system include the 
National Food Processors Association and the National Meat Association.  See USDA Mandatory Recall?  
“Why Fix Something That is Not Broken?”  MEAT INDUSTRY INTERNET NEWS SERVICE (Oct. 7, 1997), at 
www.spcnet.com/mii/1997/971029  (comments by Kelley Johnston, NFPA’s Vice President of 
Government Affairs and Communications, in testimony to the Senate Agriculture Committee); see also 
National Meat Association, Comments Before the Senate Agriculture Committee, Oct. 8, 1997, available at 
http://www.nmaonline.org/files/pr10-8.htm.
4This article examines this debate in four parts.  Part one explains the need for an 
effective recall system to protect consumers from foodborne illnesses.  Part two examines 
the current voluntary food recall system, including its basis, form, and rationale.  Part 
three notes the criticism of the voluntary recall system, fueled by the failure of large-scale 
recalls, and proposed mandatory recall legislation that was developed in direct response 
to these recall failures.  Part four recommends, in the event that mandatory recall 
authority is extended to the government, essential components for an effective mandatory 
food recall system and summarizes its potential benefits.
This article concludes that the granting of mandatory recall authority to 
government with appropriate safeguards is a sensible, minimalist approach to the 
protection of public health.  It is sensible because mandatory recall authority would 
improve a recall system that generally works fairly well but has also experienced 
significant breakdowns leading to severe criticism of the food industry and the 
government agencies responsible for monitoring the voluntary recall system.  These 
improvements include expediting the removal of unsafe food from commerce, providing 
essential insurance against the bad-actor food company, strengthening the government’s 
hand against bioterrorism, enhancing consumer confidence in food, aligning incentives 
for food companies to protect consumers against unsafe food, reducing liability exposure 
of food companies, and creating a more rational food recall system in the context of 
12
 Representative consumer advocates groups supportive of a mandatory food recall system include Safe 
Tables Our Priority (S.T.O.P.) and the Center for Science in the Public Interest (CSPI).  To view these 
groups’ respective Web sites and positions on food recall, see http://www.safetables.org; 
http://www.cspinet.org/.
13 See AM. FARM BUREAU FED’N, FARM BUREAU POLICIES FOR 2004 (2004), at 39 (adopting the following 
resolution: “[w]e support granting the Secretary of Agriculture authority to impose mandatory quarantine 
and recall of meat products based on scientific testing and detection procedures.”).
5domestic and international food safety policy.  It is a minimalist approach because, with 
appropriate safeguards in place, mandatory recall authority should not undermine the 
current cooperative recall culture existing between government and private industry.  
Food companies would continue to have incentives to voluntarily recall their unsafe food 
without undue concern of government overreach.
II.
Need for an Effective Food Recall System
While the United States is generally regarded as having the safest food supply in 
the world,14 foodborne illness caused by consuming contaminated foods or beverages is a 
compelling public health problem: the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention 
estimates that foodborne diseases cause approximately 76 million illnesses, 325,000 
hospitalizations, and 5,000 deaths annually.15    Compounding the problem is the 
constantly changing nature of foodborne illness.16  While improvements in food safety, 
such as pasteurization and proper canning, have all but eliminated some diseases,17 new 
foodborne infections have emerged.  Today there are more than 250 different foodborne 
diseases, most of which are infections, caused by a variety of bacteria, viruses, and 
parasites.18    The most commonly recognized foodborne infections are those caused by 
14
 See ECONOMIC RESEARCH SERVICE, USDA BRIEFING ROOM, GOVERNMENT FOOD SAFETY POLICIES, 
available at http://www.ers.usda.gov/Briefing/FoodSafetyPolicy/.
15 See Paul S. Mead, et al., Food-Related Illness and Death in the United States, 5 EMERGING INFECTIOUS 
DISEASES 607 (1999), available at http://www.cdc.gov/ncidod/eid/vol5no5/mead.htm.
16 See CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL, FOODBORNE ILLNESS, at 
http://www.cdc.gov/ncidod/dbmd/diseaseinfo/foodborneinfections_g.htm.
17 See id.
18 See id.  The other type of foodborne diseases is poisonings, caused by harmful toxins or chemicals that 
have contaminated the food.  See id.
6the bacteria E. coli 0157:H7, 19 Salmonella,20 Listeria,21 and Campylobacter,22 and by a 
group called calicivirus, also known as the Norwalk viruses.23
19
 An estimated 73,000 cases of infection and 61 deaths occur in the United States each year from 
Escherichia coli 0157:H7.  The organism lives in the intestines of healthy cattle.  It was first recognized as 
a cause of illness in 1982 during an outbreak of severe bloody diarrhea that was traced to contaminated 
hamburgers.  Human illness from E. coli 0157:H7 follows consumption of food or water that has been 
contaminated with cow feces.  Most infections occur from eating undercooked ground beef.  The illness it 
causes is often a severe and bloody diarrhea and painful abdominal cramps.  It can cause temporary anemia, 
profuse bleeding, and kidney failure.    See id. See also CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL , ESCHERICHIA 
COLI 0157:H7, , at 
http://www.cdc.gov/ncidod/dbmd/diseaseinfo/escherichiacoli_g.htm#What%20is%20Escherichia%20coli%
20O157:H7.
20
 Each year 40,000 cases of Salmonella are reported in the United States.  Because many milder cases are 
not diagnosed or reported, the actual number of infections may be much higher.  Salmonella is a bacterium 
that is widespread in the intestines of birds, reptiles, and mammals.  It can spread to humans from a variety 
of different foods of animal origin.  It causes salmonellosis, which includes fever, diarrhea, and abdominal 
cramps.  With persons most vulnerable, such as the elderly, infants, and those with impaired immune 
systems, it can be life-threatening.  It is estimated that 600 people die each year with acute Salmonella.  See 
Mead, supra, note 15. See also CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL, SALMONELLOSIS, at
http://www.cdc.gov/ncidod/dbmd/diseaseinfo/salmonellaosis_g.htm#What%20is%20salmonellaosis.  In 
November of 2003, the USDA announced that the rate of Salmonella in raw meat and poultry dropped by 
sixty-six percent (66%) over the past six years and by sixteen percent (16%) in 2003 compared with 2002.  
USDA attributed the drop in reported Salmonella to strong, science-based enforcement of food safety rules.  
See USDA Press Release, Tests Show Salmonella in Meat and Poultry Products Declines 66 Percent, 
available at http://www.usda.gov/news/releases/2003/11/0396.htm.
21
 An estimated 2,500 persons become seriously ill with listeriosis each year, and of this number, 500 
persons die.  Listeria monocytogenes is found in soil and water.  Uncooked vegetables, meats, processed 
foods, and unpasteurized dairy products may contain the bacterium.  Listeria may be killed by cooking; 
however, in certain ready-to-eat foods such as hot dogs and deli meats, contamination may occur after 
cooking but before packaging.  Listeria primarily affects pregnant women, newborns, and adults with 
weakened immune systems.  Listeria causes fever, muscle aches, and sometimes-gastrointestinal symptoms 
such as nausea or diarrhea.  See CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL, LISTERIA, at 
http://www.cdc.gov/ncidod/dbmd/diseaseinfo/listeriosis_g.htm#symptoms.  In October of 2003, USDA 
announced a one-year, twenty-five percent (25%) drop in positive Listeria monocytogenes samples and a 
seventy percent (70%) decline compared with years prior to the implementation of the Hazard Analysis and 
Critical Control Points (HACCP) system.  See FSIS News Release, Listeria in FSIS Ready-to-Eat Products 
Shows Significant Decline, available at http://www.fsis.usda.gov/OA/news/2003/rtedata.htm.
22 Campylobacter is estimated to affect over one million people in the United States every year, or 0.5% of 
the population.  Most cases go undiagnosed or unreported.  It is estimated that 100 persons with 
Campylobacter infections will die each year.  Campylobacter is a bacterial pathogen that causes fever, 
diarrhea, and abdominal cramps.  It is the most commonly identified bacterial cause of diarrheal illness in 
the world.  These bacteria live in the intestines of healthy birds, and most raw poultry meat has 
Campylobacter on it.  Eating undercooked chicken or other food that has been contaminated with juices 
dripping from raw chicken is the most frequent source of this infection.  See Mead, supra note 15.  See also 
CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL, CAMPYLOBACTER INFECTIONS, at 
http://www.cdc.gov/ncidod/dbmd/diseaseinfo/campylobacter_g.htm#What%20is%campylobacteriosis.
23 Norwalk-like virus is an extremely common form of foodborne illness, though rarely diagnosed.  It 
causes an acute gastrointestinal illness, usually with more vomiting than diarrhea that resolves itself after a 
7Foodborne illness outbreaks are also becoming increasingly widespread and 
complicated.  The classic outbreak of foodborne illness was confined to a local 
community, generally caused by a catered meal or a potluck dinner.24  Changes in the 
way food is prepared and consumed today25 cause foodborne illness outbreaks to affect 
many persons in many different places, spread out over long periods of time.26
To protect consumers from these foodborne illnesses, unsafe food products must 
be removed quickly and efficiently from commerce.27  Food safety is, of course, ideally
achieved by ensuring that recalls need not occur in the first place;28 however, once unsafe 
food enters commerce, recalls are a critical tool for protecting the health and lives of 
consumers.29
III.
Overview of the Current 
Voluntary Food Recall System
The current voluntary food recall system is marked by a unique food safety 
regulatory approach that allocates responsibilities to two government agencies that in turn 
few days.  Unlike many foodborne pathogens that have animal reservoirs, Norwalk-like viruses spread 
primarily from one infected person to another, such as kitchen workers who contaminate a salad or 
sandwich as they prepare it.  See Mead, supra note 15.
24 See id.
25
 These changes include first, the increasing consumption of a greater variety of foods, particularly 
seafood, fresh fruits, and vegetables that are eaten raw; second, the dramatic increase in the variety of foods 
imported from all over the world; and, third, the increasingly number of people eating more of their meals 
away from home.  See Joseph A. Levitt, FDA’s Foods Program, 56 FOOD DRUG L.J. 255, 255-256 (2001).
26 See id.
27 See UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE FOOD SAFETY AND INSPECTION SERVICE, REPORT OF 
THE RECALL WORKING GROUP (Aug. 10, 1998), available at
http://www.fsis.usda.gov/OA/programs/recallwg.htm.
28
 See FSIS Public Meeting, supra note 2, at 10. 
29 See id.
8develop oversight procedures and protocol for voluntary food recalls conducted by 
private companies.
A. Dual Agency Responsibility for Food Recall
The two government agencies charged with food recall responsibility are the 
United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) and the Food and Drug Administration 
(FDA).30  USDA derives its regulatory authority from the Meat Inspection Act31 and the 
Poultry Products Inspection Act,32 giving it responsibility for the regulation of meat, 
poultry, and certain egg products.  USDA administers a food safety and inspection 
program over these products through its branch agency, the Food Safety and Inspection 
Service (FSIS).33  FDA derives its regulatory power from various laws including the 
Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 34 giving it responsibility for the regulation of all 
other food products, including whole (or shell) eggs, sea food, milk, grain products, fruits 
and vegetables, and certain canned, frozen, and otherwise packaged foods containing 
meat, poultry, and eggs that are not regulated by USDA.35
30 GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 7, at 5.
31
 21 U.S.C. § 601(1999).
32 See id. at §§ 451-469 (1999).
33 See 7 C.F.R. § 2.53 (2004) (describing various FSIS responsibilities). 
34
 21 U.S.C. § 392(a) (1999).
35
 The distinctions between food products regulated by USDA and FDA are often confusing.  For example, 
FDA regulates the safety of egg shells, while USDA regulates processed egg products, except for certain 
processed egg products.  See  21 U.S.C. §§ 1033(f), 1034(a), 1052(c) (1999); 7 C.F.R. § 55.2 (2004) 
(definition of “egg product”).  See generally Michael R. Taylor, Preparing America’s Food Safety System 
for the Twenty-First Century—Who Is Responsible for What When It Comes to Meeting the Food Safety 
Challenges of the Consumer-Driven Global Economy? 52 FOOD DRUG L.J. 13, 18-19 (1997) (addressing 
the fragmented federal food safety system).
9This food safety regulatory regime for USDA and FDA prohibits the adulteration 
and misbranding of food.36  Implementing regulations and policy statements define 
adulteration and misbranding, and USDA and FDA enforce these provisions when 
violations are encountered.37  An important tool used by USDA and FDA in the 
enforcement of these provisions is the recall of food.38
B. Basis for Voluntary Recall: the Implicit Threat
Despite the importance of recall as an enforcement tool, neither USDA nor FDA 
has statutory authority to mandate a recall.39  Recalls administered by USDA and FDA is 
strictly voluntary.40  What then triggers a voluntary recall?  What leverage does the 
USDA or FDA have to motivate companies to voluntarily recall their food product?41
36 See 21 U.S.C. §§ 402, 453(g)(3), and 601(m)(3) (1999).  
37
 The basic legal standard for what constitutes adulterated food is the same under the Federal Food, Drug, 
and Cosmetic Act, the Federal Meat Inspection Act, and the Poultry Products Inspection Act.  Generally 
speaking, the regulatory statutes establish four adulteration provisions: 1) a food is considered adulterated if 
it contains a harmful substance that may pose a safety risk; 2) a food is adulterated if it contains an added 
harmful substance that is acquired during production or cannot be reasonably avoided, and it exceeds 
applicable tolerance levels; 3) a food is adulterated if it contains a substance that has been intentionally 
added to the food but that has not been approved or otherwise sanctioned for use by a regulatory agency or 
one of the food safety statutes; and, 4) a food is adulterated if it has been handled under unsanitary 
conditions, creating a risk of contamination with a substance that may pose a safety threat.  See THE FOOD 
INSTITUTE, HACCP & U.S. FOOD SAFETY GUIDE (2d ed.), at sec. 2, at p. 6.
38
 See Dr. Garry L. McKee, Food Safety & Inspection Service OIG Audit Report on ConAgra, Washington, 
D.C. (Oct. 2, 2003).
39
 FSIS plainly states that “[a] food recall is a voluntary action by a manufacturer or distributor to protect 
the public from products that may cause health problems or possible death.”  FOOD SAFETY AND 
INSPECTION SERVICE, BACKGROUNDER/KEY FACTS, FSIS FOOD RECALLS (2002), available at 
http://www.fsis.usda.gov/Oabackground/bkrecalls.htm. See also CENTER FOR FOOD SAFETY AND APPLIED 
NUTRITION, U.S. FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION, INDUSTRY AFFAIRS STAFF BROCHURE, FDA RECALL 
POLICIES (June 2002), available at http://vm.cfsan.fda.gov/~lrd/recall2.html.   
40 GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 7, at 3.
41
 Headlines in the news indicate that it is commonly misperceived that food products are subject to 
mandatory recall by the government.  Examples include “FDA Orders Peanut Butter Recall,” and “FDA 
Orders 6,500 Cases of Red-Dyed Mints Recalled.”  The headlines are, of course, wrong in indicating that 
the Agency can order these recalls.  See CENTER FOR FOOD SAFETY AND APPLIED NUTRITION, supra note 39, 
available at http://vm.cfsan.fda.gov/~lrd/recall2.html.
10
The answer is simple: it is the implicit threat of regulatory action, liability, and adverse 
publicity.42
The threat of regulatory action involves an array of regulatory enforcement tools 
available to USDA and FDA in varying degree and scope: warning letters,43 adverse 
publicity,44 injunction,45 retention,46 seizure,47 and criminal prosecution.48  These 
sanctions are not mutually exclusive and may build upon one another.49  Given these 
42 See FSIS Public Meeting, supra note 2, at 20-21.
43
 A warning letter from the FDA is a written communication to a company asserting that there has been a 
violation of the FDCA or implementing regulations.  The letter will typically request that the company 
inform the agency about the action the company will take to correct the alleged violation.  The warning 
letter will generally caution the company that enforcement action may be initiated “without further notice.”  
If a company does not correct the violation, further sanctions may be imposed.  In contrast to FDA’s 
practice, USDA warning letters are sent after the department has decided not to take further regulatory 
action.  In other words, the warning letter closes the file.  See THE FOOD INSTITUTE, supra note 37, at Sec. 
2, p.13.
44
 Adverse publicity consists of the dissemination of information that the company is not cooperating with 
enforcement officials.  See 21 U.S.C. § 705 (1999).  
45
 If FDA or USDA seeks an injunction, they must go to the U.S. Attorney where the company is located.  
If the prosecutor agrees to take the case, he or she will file a request for an injunction with the U.S. District 
Court.  See THE FOOD INSTITUTE, supra note 37, at sec. 2, p.17.
46
 USDA retains product when an in-plant inspector places a “tag” on product located at a federally 
inspected facility that he or she believes to be adulterated or misbranded.  Once tagged, a product cannot be 
removed from the facility without USDA approval.  In most instances, a product is either reconditioned or 
destroyed within a few days.  See id. at 15.
47
 In a seizure proceeding, the government initially seeks a court order authorizing the United States 
Marshall to “seize” the product.  A seizure action seeks the destruction of a product, not merely a 
prohibition against its shipment.  Once seized, the product cannot be moved without the court’s permission.  
The government will also file a complaint requesting that the product be “condemned” and destroyed.  See 
id. at 16.
48
 The Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA), the Poultry Products Inspection Act (PPIA), and the Federal 
Meat Inspection Act (FMIA) have strong criminal provisions that are essentially strict liability statutes: to 
obtain a conviction, the government need not establish intent to violate the law.  Two types of criminal 
violations exist: misdemeanors and felonies.  Under FDCA, most food violations are misdemeanors; 
however, FDA can request a felony conviction if the government can prove intent to defraud or mislead or 
if there has been a prior conviction.  Under PPIA and FMIA, any violation involving the distribution or 
attempted distribution of an adulterated food is a felony.  See id. at 18.
49 See id. at 12.
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regulatory threats, a recall may be the only practical option for a company experiencing a 
food safety problem.50
Companies also recall food products to minimize and avoid liability.51  A failure 
to recall unsafe food significantly increases a company’s liability exposure and the risk of 
class actions and punitive damages.52  Companies also risk adverse publicity that could 
destroy their brand image.53  Consequently, some observers deem the term “voluntary” 
recall a misnomer since it is compelled by regulatory, legal, and marketing pressures.54
C. Regulatory Oversight of Voluntary Recall
USDA and FDA oversee, monitor, and coordinate voluntary recall activities.55
USDA procedures for recalls of defective meat are found in an FSIS Directive;56 FDA 
procedures for recalls are published in the Code of Federal Regulations.57  These 
procedures have been developed into recall programs that USDA, through FSIS, and 
FDA employ for the foods they regulate.58  Notwithstanding these recall programs and 
50 See FSIS Public Meeting, supra note 2, at 17-21.
51 See generally John M. Packman, Civil and Criminal Liability Associated with Food Recalls, 53 FOOD & 
DRUG L.J. 437 (1998).
52 See id.
53 See FSIS Public Meeting, supra note 2, at 181.
54 See National Meat Association, supra note 11, available at http://www.nmaonline.org/files/pr10-8.htm.
55 See GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE,  supra note 7, at 5.  
56 See UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE, FSIS INFORMATION CENTER, FSIS DIRECTIVE
8080.1, REV. 3, RECALL OF MEAT AND POULTRY PRODUCTS, available at
http://www.fsis.usda.gov/OA.recalls/rec_intr.htm; UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE, FSIS 
DIRECTIVE, RECALL OF MEAT AND POULTRY PRODUCTS (Jan.19, 2000), available at
http://www.fsis.usda.gov/OPPDE/frdad/FSISDirectives/8080.1Rev3.htm. 
57 See 21 C.F.R. §§ 7.40-.59 (2003).
58 See GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 7, at 6.
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the presence of the implicit threat, the essence of food recall activity is still voluntary: 
companies are not required by law to recall unsafe food,59 and even if companies elect to 
voluntarily recall unsafe food, they are not required by law or regulation to notify USDA 
or FDA of their recall.60
1. FSIS Voluntary Recall Program
When FSIS learns that adulterated or misbranded meat or poultry may be in 
commerce,61 it conducts a preliminary investigation to determine whether a recall of the 
food product is warranted.62  If FSIS determines that a recall is necessary, it convenes a 
meeting of its Recall Committee that is comprised FSIS scientists, technical experts, field 
inspection managers, enforcement personnel, and communication specialists.63  The 
Recall Committee evaluates available information and, based on the health risk of the 
food product, categorizes the recall into one of three classes: a Class I recall where a 
strong likelihood exists that a product will cause serious adverse health consequences or 
death,64 a Class II recall where a remote possibility exists of an adverse health 
59 See id.
60 See id. at 7, 11.
61
 FSIS can learn about the possibility of unsafe meat from several sources: the company that manufactured 
or distributed the meat, test results received by FSIS as part of its sampling program, FSIS field inspectors 
and compliance officers, consumer complaints, epidemiological data submitted by state or local public 
health departments, and government agencies.  See FSIS, REPORT OF THE RECALL WORKING GROUP, supra note
27, available at http://www.fsis.usda.gov/Oabackground/bkrecalls.htm.
62
 The preliminary investigation includes some or all of the following steps: collecting and verifying 
information about the inspected food; documenting a chronology of events; contacting the manufacturer of 
the food for more information; discussions with FSIS field inspection and compliance personnel; 
interviewing a consumer who allegedly became ill or injured from eating the food; collecting and analyzing 
food samples; and, contacting state and local health departments.  See id.
63 See FSIS DIRECTIVE, supra note 56, available at
http://www.fsis.usda.gov/OPPDE/rdad/FSISDirectives/8080.1Rev3.htm.
64
 An example of a Class I recall would be meat that is contaminated with pathogenic bacteria, such as 
Listeria monocytogenes in a ready-to-eat product or Escherichia coli 0157:H7 in raw ground beef.  Another  
13
consequence resulting from consuming the meat or poultry product,65 or a Class III recall 
where the consumption of the product will not cause adverse health consequences.66  The 
Recall Committee also recommends the depth and scope of the recall.67  FSIS and the 
recalling company conduct effectiveness checks to determine the adequacy of notice 
about the recall and the success in removing the product.68  FSIS notifies the public of 
recalls in two ways: a press release69 and a recall notification report.70  FSIS also posts 
recall notification reports on its Web site and sends these reports to food safety and 
public health officials throughout the country.71
example includes the adding of Class I allergens, such as peanuts or eggs, as an ingredient in processed 
meat without listing them on the label.  See FSIS, REPORT OF THE WORKING RECALL GROUP, 
supra note 27, available at http://www.fsis.usda.gov/OA/programs/recallwg.htm.
65
 An example of a Class II recall would be the presence of dry milk as an ingredient in sausage without 
mention of the dry milk on the label.  Another example is the presence of undeclared allergens such as milk 
or soy products.  See id.  The well-publicized Class II recall announced on December 23, 2003, involving 
the BSE incident was designated a Class II by the FDA due to an extremely low likelihood that the 
products contained the infectious agent that causes BSE.  The infected tissues including the brain, spinal 
cord, and distal ileum, were all removed from the carcass on the day of slaughter, meaning that the meat 
produced were cuts that would not be expected to be infected or have an adverse public health impact.  See
FSIS UPDATE OF RECALL ACTIVITIES (Feb. 9, 2004), available at 
http://www.fsis.usda.gov/oa/recalls/prelease/update067-2003.html.
66
 An example of Class III recall would be improperly labeled processed meat in which added water is not 
listed on the label as required by the federal regulations.  See id.
67 See OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL, supra note 4, at 3.  
68 See GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 7, at 29.  
69
 In February 2000, USDA began issuing press releases for all three classes of recalls, even if the product 
is not identifiable to consumers.  See id. at 16, 28.  The press release is issued to media outlets in the area 
where the product was distributed and to an email list-serv.  See FSIS BACKGROUNDER, supra note 39.  The 
public can request to receive FSIS press releases and other FSIS materials by subscribing to the FSIS 
Constituent Update at www.fsis.usda.gov/oa/update/subscribe.asp.  The news release is posted on the FSIS 
Recall Web site at www.fsis.usda.gov/OA/recalls/rec_intr.htm.
70
 Recall Notification Reports (RNR) provide the public with detailed information about meat and poultry 
recalls.  RNRs are sent by facsimile and electronic mail to food safety and public health officials 
throughout the country.  See id. 
71
 The RNR are posted on the FSIS Recall Web site at www.fsis.usda.gov/OA/recalls/rec_intr.htm.      
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2. FDA Voluntary Recall Program
When FDA learns that a recall needs to be, will be, or has been initiated,72 the 
FDA’s district office73obtains preliminary information about the recall and product and 
provides this information to FDA’s Center for Food Safety and Applied Nutrition 
(CFSAN)74 and FDA’s Office of Regulatory Affairs (ORA)75 within 24 hours.76  The 
district office may assist the company in developing a recall strategy, although companies 
are not required to consult with FDA or modify its recall strategy on the basis of FDA’s 
recommendations.77  CFSAN prepares a written health hazard evaluation that is used to 
classify the recall into one of three classes:78a Class I recall for dangerous or defective 
products that predictably could cause serious health problems or death,79a Class II recall 
for products that might cause a temporary health problem or pose only a slight threat of a 
serious nature,80 and a Class III recall for situations where eating the food will not cause 
72
 FDA’s recall regulations request that a company notify FDA when a company removes or corrects a 
distributed product.  See CENTER FOR FOOD SAFETY AND APPLIED NUTRITION INDUSTRY, supra note 39, 
available at http://vm.cfsan.fda.gov/~lrd/recall2.html. 
73
 For a description of the responsibilities of district offices in a food product recall, see Sandra Nowlin 
Whetstone, ORA’s Role at FDA Headquarters and in the Field for Product Recalls, 53 FOOD & DRUG L. J.
513 (1998).
74
 See id. (describing CFSAN).
75
 See id. (describing ORA).
76
 FDA’s Regulatory Procedures Manual describes procedures for FDA staff to use in handling recalls of 
FDA- regulated food products.  See GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 7, at 31.
77 See id. at 32.
78 See id. at 32-33.
79
 Examples of Class I recall are a food found to contain botulinal toxin and food with undeclared allergens.  
CENTER FOR FOOD SAFETY AND APPLIED NUTRITION, supra note 39, available at
http://vm.cfsan.fda.gov/~lrd/recall2.html.
80 See id.
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adverse consequences.81  FDA monitors the progress of a company’s recall through its 
termination.82  FDA encourages the recalling company to issue a press release for Class I 
and selected Class II recalls.83  When FDA believes that the public needs to be alerted 
about a serious hazard, FDA will issue its own press release.84  FDA also posts an 
Enforcement Report on its Web site, listing all food recalls by the agency.85
3. Market Withdrawal and Stock Recovery
In addition to recalls, other actions may be taken by a food company to remove a 
product from commerce, including market withdrawal and stock recovery.86  Market 
withdrawal is the removal of a distributed product that involves a minor violation that 
would not be subject to legal action by the FDA or FSIS, or when the company wishes to 
remove a product from distribution for other reasons, such as when a product does not 
meet the company’s internal specifications.87  Stock recovery is the removal of a product 
that has not been placed in retail distribution channels but is still under the direct control 
of the food company.88
81
 Examples of Class III recall are a container defect, off-taste color, leaks in a bottle, and a lack of English 
labeling in a retail food.  See id.
82 See GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 7, at 33.
83 See id. at 34.  
84 See id. 
85
 This is found through FDA Enforcement Reports, a weekly publication, available at 
http://www.fda.gov/opacom/7alerts.html.
86 See NATIONAL FOOD PROCESSORS ASSOCIATION, FACT SHEET ON FOOD AND BEVERAGE PRODUCT RECALL, available 
at http://www.nfpa-food.org/members/science/recallqa.html.
87
 21 C.F.R. § 7.3(j) (1996) (2003); see also FOOD PROCESSORS, supra note 86.
88
 21 C.F.R. § 7.3(k) (1996) (2003); see also FOOD PROCESSORS, supra note 86.
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D. Policy Rationale for Voluntary Recall
Support for the current voluntary recall system rests on two predicates: first, that 
it effectively removes unsafe food products from commerce;89 and second, that it 
engenders cooperation between government and industry.90  Defenders of the voluntary 
recall system believe that companies have generally initiated recalls without delays, 
either on their own initiative or in response to requests to voluntarily do so.91  USDA 
officials often comment that there are no instances in which companies delayed or failed 
to initiate a recall;92 however, a United States General Accounting Office (GAO) report 
questions this claim on the grounds that it is purely anecdotal, since USDA nor FDA 
systematically measure the full extent of companies’ recall activities.93  The same GAO 
report also noted that the FDA reported at least nine cases where companies delayed or 
failed to initiate a recall.94  In spite of the GAO criticism of USDA’s claim, USDA 
officials continue to make the claim.95  This alleged success is credited to the “implicit 
threat” of government enforcement, adverse publicity, and liability exposure.96  Given 
89
 USDA and FDA documented more than 3,700 food recalls from the mid-1980’s through 1999.  GENERAL 
ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 7, at 33.  In the last decade, the number and size of recalls have increased 
dramatically, particularly Class I recalls.   Michael Ollinger & Nicole Ballenger, Weighing Incentives for 
Food Safety in Meat and Poultry, AMBER WAVES, April 2003, available at 
http:www.ers.usda.gov/Amberwaves/April 03/Features/WeighingIncentives.htm.  
90 See FSIS Public Meeting, supra note 2.
91 See FSIS RECALL WORKING GROUP, supra note 27, at 14.
92 FRONTLINE, PBS, MEAT RECALLS, available at
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/meat/safe/recalls.html.  
93 See OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL supra, note 4, at 37.  
94 See id.
95 See FSIS Public Meeting, supra note 2, at 191.
96 See FSIS Public Meeting, supra note 2, at 20-21.
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this success, mandatory recall authority is viewed unnecessary, since USDA and FDA 
arguably have more than enough authority and leverage to require the recall of unsafe 
food products.97
Advocates of “voluntary” recalls often prefer the term “cooperative” recall as 
being more descriptive of the present system in which the recalling company and the 
government agency work together to evaluate the product and risk and to recover that 
product.98  The concern is that mandatory recalls would destabilize the current 
cooperative regulatory environment and antagonize a private sector that is motivated to 
prevent foodborne illnesses.99 Instead of a cooperative environment, the mandatory recall 
system would generate an adversarial system marked by litigation and recrimination.100
Supporters of voluntary recall also view this “cooperative” recall approach as 
consistent with the direction in which USDA and FDA are moving on the Hazard 
Analysis and Critical Points System (HACCP).101  HACCP is heralded as critical to 
government and industry joint efforts to ensure safe food.102  The idea behind HACCP is 
that the government agency monitor and oversee a company’s performance and record 
keeping.103  The logical extension is then made that since the current voluntary recall 
97 See National Meat Association, supra note 11, available at http://www.nmaonline.org/files/pr10-8.htm; 
see also James H. Hodges, Meat and Poultry Regulatory Update, 54 FOOD & DRUG L. J. 459, 460 (1999).
98 See National Meat Association, supra note 11, at http://www.nmaonline.org/files/pr10-8.htm.
99See MEAT INDUSTRY INTERNET NEWS SERVICE, supra note 11, available at www.spcnet.com/mii/1997/971029
100 See FSIS Public Meeting, supra note 2, at 179-82.
101 See id.  The GAO report notes that since January 2000, USDA contends that the responsibility for the 
food recall process rests with food companies due to the requirement that food companies are required to 
implement HACCP systems.  See GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 7, at 20.
102 See MICHAEL S. SCHUMANN ET AL., FOOD SAFETY LAW 123-35 (1997).
103 See id.
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system is based on monitoring and oversight by government, it fosters the same spirit of 
cooperation created by HACCP.104  This argument frames the overall “cooperative” 
regulatory philosophy of USDA’s and FDA’s food safety responsibilities, but it leaves 
unanswered the practical question: does a voluntary or mandatory food recall system best 
remove unsafe food from commerce?
IV.
Criticism of Voluntary Recall Leading to Efforts to
Enact Mandatory Recall Legislation 
Record-breaking recalls that have taxed the ability of the USDA and the recalling 
companies to effectively remove unsafe meat from commerce have provoked stinging 
criticism of the voluntary recall system from the media, consumer advocacy groups, 
members of Congress, government officials, and the Office of Inspector General.105
These recalls were followed by proposed legislation that would have empowered USDA 
and FDA with mandatory recall authority.  All attempts to empower these agencies with 
mandatory recall authority, however, have failed.
A. Hudson Foods Recall of 1997
In 1997, Hudson Foods, Inc. (Hudson), an Arkansas-based meat processing 
company, engaged in what became the nation’s largest beef recall.106  Hudson was the 
fifth largest producer of chicken products and the twelfth largest producer of turkey 
104 See FSIS Public Meeting, supra note 2, at 181-82.
105
 The increase in the number and size of food recalls over the last several years is attributed to regulatory 
changes, improved testing techniques, and an adeptness at identifying foodborne illness outbreaks.  See
Ollinger and Ballenger, supra note 89, available at http:www.ers.usda.gov/Amberwaves/April 
03/Features/WeighingIncentives.htm.
106 See Rick Weiss, USDA Widens Investigation of Arkansas Meat Company, WASH. POST, Aug. 17, 1997, 
at A11, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/politics/govt/admin/stories/glick081797.htm.
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products in the country and was a supplier of beef products to such major chains as 
Burger King, Boston Market, and Wal-Mart.107  USDA learned of a problem from the 
Colorado Department of Public Health and Environment after it received reports of 
illness from several Colorado consumers who had eaten Hudson hamburger patties in 
early July of 1997.108  The meat was traced to a Nebraska plant owned by Hudson, where 
quarter-pound hamburger patties were found contaminated with E. coli 0157:H7.109
Eventually, sixteen people became ill as a result of eating meat processed at the Hudson 
plant.110
Relying on estimates by Hudson officials as to how much beef should be recalled, 
the recall was limited to only 20,000 pounds, even though the plant produced 400,000 
pounds per shift.111  Hudson officials112 told investigators that the contaminated lot 
included 3,400 pounds of meat that had been “reworked” into 20,000 pounds of 
hamburger the next day.  Plant officials neglected to tell USDA investigators, however, 
that meat continued to be reworked from one day to the next, so that once a contaminated 
lot of meat got into the system, it would be mixed sequentially into all subsequent lots.  
107 See id.
108 See United States Department of Agriculture, Press Release, Glickman Announces Hudson to Act on 
USDA Recommendation to Close Nebraska Plant, Recall All Hudson Beef Products (Aug. 21, 1997), 
available at http://www.usda.gov/news/releases/1997/08/0283.
109 See United States Department of Agriculture, Press Release, Developments in Hudson Foods E. coli 
Outbreak (Aug. 20, 1997), available at http://www.usda.gov/news/releases/1997/08/0284.
110 See Weiss, supra note 106, at A11.
111 See id.
112
 Two Hudson officials were indicted on federal charges of misleading USDA officials about the extent of 
potential contamination in the early stages of the recall.  See Jeff Taylor & Alison Young, Recalls Expose 
the Limits of USDA, DETROIT FREE PRESS, March 5, 1999, available at 
http://www.freep.com/news/health/qlegis5.htm.
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Once this information was disclosed and it was faced with the possibility of having its 
plant closed down, Hudson began a voluntary recall that eventually included 25 million 
pounds of potentially contaminated meat.113  The problem with the expanded recall, 
however, was that much of the beef being recalled was already sold and presumably  
consumed.114
1. Response to Hudson Foods Recall
The Hudson Recall was viewed as an example of the breakdown of the
voluntary food recall system.  Critics noted that USDA’s lack of recall authority
results in dangerous delays when companies such as Hudson question the extent or basis 
for a recall and wait before acting.115  Consumer groups advocated that mandatory recall 
authority be given to the government.116  Members of Congress also promoted mandatory 
recall.  United States Senator Tom Harkin (D-Iowa) stated at the time that “[m]andatory 
recall authority puts the secretary in a stronger position to ensure that recalls occur on 
time and that they cover all the contaminated products.”117  The USDA also issued a 
press release stating that “[m]andatory notification will improve food safety because the 
quicker USDA is notified of potentially contaminated meat and poultry, the quicker 
113 See Weiss, supra note 106, at A11.
114 See Hamburger Recall Rises to 25 million Pounds, CNN INTERACTIVE, Aug. 21, 1997, available at 
http://www.cnn.com/US/9708/21/beef.update/index.html.
115 See Consumer Group Pushes Food Safety Law, CNN INTERACTIVE, Feb. 4, 1998, available at 
http://www.cnn.com/HEALTH/9802/04/safe.food/.
116 See id.
117 See Taylor & Young, supra note 112, available at http://www.freep.com/news/health/qlegis5.htm.
21
American consumers can be protected.”118  Not everyone shared Senator Harkin’s and the 
USDA’s views, however.  Meat processors opposed mandatory recall, contending that it 
is not needed since USDA could not cite any cases of companies refusing a recall request 
and that there were adequate incentives for companies to recall unsafe food products.119
2. Proposed Food Safety Enforcement Enhancement Act of 1997
The Food Safety Enforcement Enhancement Act of 1997 (FSEEA) was 
introduced in direct response to the Hudson Foods recall.120  FSEEA authorized USDA to 
require mandatory recall of adulterated or misbranded products when companies refused 
to take voluntary action.121  Upon a finding by the Secretary of Agriculture that 
reasonable probability exists that a meat or poultry product could endanger public health 
if consumed, the Secretary would provide the company with an opportunity to cease 
distribution and recall the product.122  If the company refused to take direct action, the 
Secretary could then mandate a recall.123
118 See United States Department Of Agriculture, Press Release No. 0297.97, Glickman Unveils Proposed 
Law to Strengthen Meat, Poultry Recalls (Aug. 29, 1997), available at 
http://www.usda.gov/news/releases/1997/08/0297. 
119 See MEAT INDUSTRY INTERNET NEWS SERVICE, supra note 11, at www.spcnet.com/mii/1997/971029.
120 See Hana Simon, Comment, Food Safety Enforcement Act of 1997: Putting Public Health Before the 
Meat Industry’s Bottom Line, 50 ADMIN. L. REV. 679, 682 (1998); see also CSPI, Press Release, Recipe 
For Safe Food Campaign Launched to Improve Food Safety Laws (Feb. 24, 1998), available at 
http://www.cspinet.org/new/recipepr.htm.
121 See United States Department of Agriculture, Press Release, Introduction of the New Food Safety 
Legislation (Aug. 29, 1997), available at http://www.usda.gov/news/releases/1997/08/0298.
122 See id.
123 See id.
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At the same time, FDA proposed analogous legislation known as the FDA Food 
Safety Enforcement Act.124  Citing specific instances where companies failed to enforce a 
voluntary recall,125 FDA proposed adding a new section to the FDCA that provided that 
persons (other than consumers) who had a reasonable basis for believing that a food 
article in interstate commerce might be adulterated would be required to notify the 
Secretary of DHHS immediately.126  If the agency’s request for a voluntary recall were 
rebuffed, the provision would allow the Secretary to order the recall.127
B. ConAgra Recall of 2002
The next large-scale recall plagued with problems involved contaminated meat 
processed and produced at the ConAgra plant in Greeley, Colorado.128  The plant is one 
of the largest in the nation, employing about 2,500 people.129  The plant slaughters about 
1.2 million cattle a year and processes, on average, about 350 cattle per hour.130
124 See FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION, FDA TALK PAPER, FDA PROPOSES LEGISLATION TO IMPROVE 
FOOD SAFETY (Aug. 29, 1997) (description of proposed FDA legislation).  The FDA version of FSEEA 
was sponsored by Representative Frank Pallone (D-N.J.).  See also CENTER FOR FOOD SCIENCE IN THE 
PUBLIC INTEREST, GIVE THE FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION TOUGH NEW AUTHORITY TO ENFORCE 
FOOD SAFETY LAWS, at http://www.cspinet.org/reports/hr3070.html.
125
 The first case involved Royal Line smoked salmon contaminated with Listeria.  The salmon, sold in 
plastic packages, was imported from Denmark.  The salmon’s United States distributor refused to cooperate 
in the recall.  The second case involved huumus dips and salads produced by Cedar’s Mediterranean Foods, 
Inc. that were potentially contaminated with dangerous bacteria.  Although the company claimed to be 
implementing a voluntary recall, it apparently had not removed all foods subject to recall from the market, 
and FDA had to repeat recall warnings about the products.  See id. 
126 See FDA TALK PAPER, supra note 124.
127 See id.
128 See OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL, supra note 4, at 3.    
129 See id. at 1n.2.
130 See id.
23
Beginning in mid-June 2002, at least 46 people in 16 states became ill from 
contaminated meat.131  ConAgra officials agreed to an initial voluntary recall of 354,200 
pounds of ground beef produced in late May of that year.132  A subsequent FSIS review 
of ConAgra records showed that beef product from the Greeley plant had been testing 
positive for E. coli 0157:H7 as early as April 12, 2002, and as late as July 11, 2002.  At 
that time, the Greeley plant produced over 1 million pounds of beef a day.133
On July 18, 2002, because of the FSIS review, ConAgra decided that the recall 
needed to be expanded to include over 18 million pounds of ground beef and beef trim.134
FSIS then issued a Notice of Intended Enforcement to ConAgra that allowed the 
company three days to respond in writing to demonstrate why an inadequacy 
determination should not be made against its sanitation standard operating procedure and 
its HACCP system.  Based on ConAgra’s response and planned corrective actions, the 
Notice was held in abeyance, and the plant continued to operate from July through mid-
November.135  On November 15, 2002, due to repeated zero-tolerance failures, FSIS 
suspended inspection services, effectively closing the plant.  The plant was allowed to 
resume operations on November 20, 2002, after presenting FSIS with planned corrective 
actions.136  Despite the recall, the majority of the beef was never returned.137
131 See id. at 1.
132 See id.
133 See id.
134 See id. at 2.
135 See id.
136 See id.
137 See CNN INTERACTIVE HAMBURGER RECALL, supra, note 114, available at 
http://www.cnn.com/US/9708/21/beef.update/index.html.
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2. Response to ConAgra Recall
Although some in the meat industry viewed the ConAgra recall as too broad,138as 
in the Hudson recall, USDA’s actions in the ConAgra recall received widespread 
publicity and criticism in the press and from Congress.139  These critics noted that the 
recall did not start until the end of June, even though contaminated product was first 
produced in April, and that the recall had to be expanded because not all potentially 
contaminated products had been identified until July.140
At the request of Congress, the Office of Inspector General (OIG) evaluated the 
effectiveness of USDA’s management and oversight of the ConAgra product and on 
September 30, 2003, issued an audit report.141  The report found that both ConAgra and 
FSIS were unprepared for the recall because adequate controls and processes were not in 
place to timely identify the source of the contaminated product or ensure that appropriate 
enforcement actions would be taken.142  According to the OIG, FSIS “needs to reassess 
its management and oversight of the recall process.”143  The report further noted that 
FSIS failed to address problems that it was aware of prior to the recall.  Before the recall, 
FSIS issued multiple noncompliance notifications to ConAgra for fecal contamination of 
138 See Elizabeth Becker, ConAgra Sets Off Latest Food Poisoning Epidemic, N.Y. TIMES, July 20, 2002, 
available at http:www.organicconsumers.org/Toxic/ConAgra0702.cfm.
139 See id. at 2.  See e.g., Bill McAllister, Senators Seek Meat-Recall Probe, DENV. POST, July 31, 2002, 
available at http://www/denverpost.com/Stories/0,1413,36%7E53%7E64269,00.html; George B. Pyle, The 
Dangers of Mystery Meat, WASH. POST, Aug. 17, 2002, at A17.
140 See OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL, supra note 4, at 2.
141 See id. at i.
142 See id. at ii.
143 See id.
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product but took no decisive enforcement action.  Instead, it continually allowed 
ConAgra to introduce superficial stopgap measures.144  Stopping short of recommending 
mandatory recall authority,145 the report made thirty-one key recommendations for FSIS 
to implement in its management of future recalls.146
FSIS deemed the IGO report irrelevant for four reasons.147  First, FSIS noted that 
at the time of the report’s issuance it had already implemented changes in its recall 
procedure.148  Second, FSIS did not view the conditions described in the report as 
widespread but as isolated to a single plant.149  Third, FSIS had already eliminated a 
program that exempted ConAgra and other meat processors from the FSIS’s own testing 
program for E. coli.150  Fourth, federal inspectors now undergo training focused on public 
health and systematically review plant-generated testing data.151
3. Proposed Safer Meat, Poultry, and Foods Act of 2002
The Safer Meat, Poultry, and Foods Act of 2002 (Safer Act) was introduced in the 
wake of the ConAgra recall152and addressed recall authority for both USDA and FDA 
and enforcement generally.   The Safer Act had three key parts:  first, the authority to 
144 See id.
145 See id.
146 See id. at 16-94.
147 See McKee, supra note 38.  
148 See id.
149 See id.
150 See id.
151 See id.
152 See Bill McAllister, supra note 139, available at 
http://www/denverpost.com/Stories/0,1413,36%7E53%7E64269,00.html.
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mandate the recall of meat, poultry, or food products, whether those be FDA-regulated 
products or USDA-regulated products; second, the requirement that companies notify 
USDA or FDA if they know their product is adulterated; and, third, authority to levy 
fines for violations of food safety regulations.153  Despite strong support from consumer 
groups,154 the Safer Act and the FSEEA met the same fate: they died in committee.155
The demise of these bills demonstrates a continual resistance to the government’s having 
mandatory food recall authority.156
C. The Logical Conundrum of Voluntary Recall Support 
Despite their apparent persuasive appeal to lawmakers, the arguments in favor of 
voluntary recall -- that the government already has sufficient enforcement power and that 
mandatory recall authority will destabilize the cooperative nature of the voluntary recall 
system157 -- are difficult to reconcile.  If the government’s impressive array of 
enforcement tools compel “voluntary” recalls, then mandatory recalls should not disrupt 
the tone of the current regulatory environment since both systems share the common goal 
of compelling the recall of unsafe food products.  A more tenable criticism would be that 
mandatory recall authority would be superfluous, not disruptive.  Moreover, if a 
153 See SAFER Meat, Poultry, and Food Act, available at http://www.theorator.com/bills108/hr3547.html.
154 See Consumers Union, Press Release, Consumer Reports Magazine Backs Harkin Food Safety Bill in 
Chicken Expose (Feb. 24, 1998), available at http://www.consumersunion.org/food/0224harkin.htm; CNN 
INTERACTIVE, Consumer Group, supra note 115, available at 
http://www.cnn.com/HEALTH/9802/04/safe.food/; Safe Tables, Press Release, Victims’ Organization 
Calls ConAgra’s ‘Voluntary’ Recall of 18 Million Pounds of E. Coli-Poisoned Meat ‘A Sham’ (June 19, 
2002), available at http://www.safetables.org/Media/Press_Releases/pr_conagra_sham_06_2002.html.
155 See Chryssa V. Deliganis, Death by Apple Juice: The Problem of Foodborne Illness, the Regulatory 
Response, and Further Suggestions for Reform, 53 FOOD DRUG L.J. 681, 719 (1998).
156 See FSIS Public Meeting, supra note 2, at 191.
157 See FSIS Public Meeting, supra note 2, at 179-82.
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mandatory recall system can be devised that still allows and encourages voluntary recalls 
by food companies, then the implicit threat that now compels voluntary recalls will 
continue to compel companies to do so.  The difference will be that a mandatory recall 
system will render the implicit threat a real threat.   
It is also difficult to reconcile the disparate treatment by the government in the 
recall of food and non-food products.  The government has mandatory recall authority for 
numerous non-food products:158 the Consumer Protection Safety Commission (CPSC) 
has the authority to order a recall unsafe consumer products;159 the Environmental 
Protection Agency (EPA) has the authority to order a recall of dangerous chemicals;160
the FDA has the authority to order a recall for a number of medical products161 and for 
one food product – infant formula;162 the National Highway Traffic System 
Administration (NHTSA) of the U.S. Department of Transportation has the authority to 
order a recall of motor vehicle products;163 and, the U.S. Coast Guard (USCG) has the 
authority to order a recall of recreation boats and related equipment.164  The inconsistency 
in the recall policy towards food and non-food products raises important policy questions.  
Are unsafe food products less of a public health concern than dangerous consumer and 
158 Six federal agencies with different jurisdictions have joined together to create a “one stop shop” Web 
site for U.S. government recalls.  See http:www.recalls.gov/.
159 See Consumer Protection Safety Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2064 (1998). 
160 See Toxic Substances Control Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2605 (1998).
161 See Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. § 360h(b) (1999).
162 See Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. § 350a(e)(1)(B) (1999).
163 See National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act, 49 U.S.C. § 30118 (b) (1997).
164 See Federal Boat Safety Act, 46 U.S.C. § 4310 (2003).
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other non-food products?  Is there a rational public policy explanation as to why food 
products should be singled out for exemption to mandatory recall authority? 
V.
Devising a Sensible Mandatory Food Recall System
Given the reported shortcomings of the current voluntary recall system for food 
products, it is worth evaluating the merits of a mandatory food recall system.  This 
section recommends the necessary components for an effective mandatory recall system 
and lists the benefits derived from implementation of these components.   This section 
also examines the potential benefit of delegating food recall responsibility to a single 
food safety agency, rather than two different government agencies. 
A. Necessary Components of Mandatory Recall System
In order to give teeth to the recall enforcement powers of FDA and USDA and
at the same time protect against the concern of government overreach,165 a mandatory 
recall system needs to have both express powers and safeguards.  Below are some of the 
powers and safeguards that should be considered by policy makers.
1. Express Powers
• Express Authority to Mandate a Recall -- The first obvious tool is the 
express authority to mandate the recall of food products, whether they are FDA or USDA 
regulated products.  If the agency finds that the food product is adulterated or misbranded 
and that there is a reasonable probability that human consumption of such food presents a 
165 See MEAT INDUSTRY INTERNET NEWS SERVICE, supra note 11, at www.spcnet.com/mii/1997/971029.
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threat to public health, the agency should be provided the authority to stop the 
distribution and recall the product.166
• Fast-Track Recall – Consideration should be given to adopting a fast-
track-recall program for unsafe food products patterned after the CPSC fast-track 
program. 167  The CPSC’s award winning fast-track program168 encourages companies to 
recall dangerous products quickly and efficiently in a streamlined process.169  The CPSC 
program eliminates some of the procedural steps in the traditional consumer goods recall 
process, including the staff preliminary determination that the product contains a defect 
that presents a substantial product hazard.170 A similar streamlined process should work 
with the food industry.
• Notification Requirement – All companies throughout the distribution 
chain should be required to notify USDA or FDA if they know their food product is 
adulterated or misbranded.171 Where the objective is to remove the unsafe food product 
from commerce, it is imperative that companies are legally obligated to notify the 
authorities when they discover a problem.
166
 The “reasonable probability” standard for triggering the mandatory recall authority was included in both 
the FSEEA and SAFER Act proposals.  See FDA TALK PAPER, supra, note 124; see also SAFER Meat, 
Poultry, and Food Act, supra note 153, available at http://www.theorator.com/bills108/hr3547.html.
167See Section 15(b) of the Consumer Product Safety Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2064(b) (1998).
168
 The CPSC fast-track program was named a 1998 winner of the prestigious innovations in American 
Government award.  See U.S. CONSUMER PRODUCT SAFETY COMMISSION, INNOVATIONS IN 
AMERICAN GOVERNMENT AWARD: FAST-TRACK RECALL PROGRAM, available at 
http:www.cpsc.gov/fast.html.
169See Mark J. Schoem, Foreward to U.S. Consumer Product Safety Commission Recall Handbook,   
available at http:www.cpsc.gov/businfo/8002.html (May 1999).
170 See id.
171
 A notification provision was included in both the FSEEA and SAFER Act proposals.  See id.  The 
SAFER Act excepted from this notification requirement household consumers.  See id.
30
• Authority to Levy Fines – In addition to mandatory recall authority, 
USDA and FDA should be given authority to levy fines for violations of food safety 
regulations.172   The amount of fines should be established to be fair to the infringing 
company but significant enough to deter irresponsible conduct.173
• Comprehensive Mandatory Recall Coverage -- USDA and FDA should 
have the authority to order the recall of suspected food from the entire food distribution 
system.174 This farm-to-table continuum would include food processors, meat packing 
plants, restaurants, and grocery stores.
• Emergency Powers for Acts of Terrorism -- There should be a provision 
for immediate notice and recall if an act of terrorism is suspected to have rendered a food 
product unsafe.175  In the event of a terrorism threat, certain safeguards enumerated in this 
article may need to be suspended to protect public health.  Acts of terrorism threatening 
the safety of food is an increasing concern for at least two reasons.176  First, the 
172
 Former Secretary of Agriculture, Dan Glickman, noted the discrepancy between the USDA ability to 
levy fines for food safety infractions compared to other government powers:  “Currently, the USDA can 
levy fines for abuse of circus elephants, selling a cat without a license and marketing a potato that’s too 
small, . . . . Yet we do not have the ability to fine companies for producing unsafe food.  That is 
unacceptable.”  Taylor & Young, supra, note 112, available at 
http://www.freep.com/news/health/qlegis5.htm. 
173
 Both the FSEEA and SAFER Act proposals authorized the Secretary to impose civil penalties of not 
more than $100,000 for each violation against a company that violates provisions of the Act.  See United 
States Department of Agriculture, Press Release, supra note 121, available at 
http://www.usda.gov/news/releases/1997/08/0298.
174
 Both the FSEEA and SAFER Act proposals extend the notification and recall requirements to all 
companies involved in the distribution chain.  See id.
175
 Under the administrative detention provision of new Bioterrorism Act, for the first time, FDA will have 
authority to detain food where it has evidence that the food could cause serious illness or death.  See The 
Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act (Bioterrorism Act), Pub. L. No. 
107-188, § 143, 116 Stat. 594 (2002).
176 See Peter Chalk, Hitting America’s Soft Underbelly: The Potential Threat of Deliberate Biological 
Attacks Against the U.S. Agricultural and Food Industry, RAND, National Defense Research Institute 
(2004), at 7.
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increasing number of entry points in the farm-to-table continuum increase the chances for 
toxins and bacteria to be introduced into the food chain with relative ease.177  Second, a 
lack of security and surveillance render many meat and vegetable processing and packing 
plants susceptible to deliberate bio-attacks.178
• Authority to Require Recall Plans – FSIS and FDA should be given 
authority to require food companies to include in their HACCP plan the steps that would 
be necessary to conduct an effective recall of food product.179  Ensuring that food 
companies include plans for a recall in their HACCP plan would help maximize the 
recovery of contaminated product.180
2. Safeguards
• Allowing for Voluntary Recall – A company should have the option of 
voluntarily recalling its food product and notifying the public within the time and manner 
prescribed by the agency.181 Although the Consumer Product Safety Act empowers the 
CPSC to order product recalls, nearly all recalls administered by CPSC are still 
voluntary.182 This is also true with other non-food products – notwithstanding mandatory 
177 See id. at 16.
178 See id.
179
 Recommendation No. 12 in the GAO report following the ConAgra recall recommended that FSIS 
should seek such authorizing legislation.  See OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL, supra note 4, at 42.
180 See id. at 43.
181
 Providing the company the opportunity to voluntarily recall the adulterated or misbranded product was 
specified in both the FSEEA and SAFER Act proposals.  See id.
.
182 See James T. O’Reilly, Product Recalls & the Third Restatement: Consumers Lose Twice from Defects 
in Products and in the Restatement Itself, 33 U. MEM. L. REV. 883, 899 (Summer 2003).
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recall authority, companies nearly always engage in voluntary recall of substandard 
products.183
• Extension of Due Process -- Due process protection should be afforded to 
the food companies.184  A company should be able to request an informal hearing before 
an independent administrative judge when USDA or FDA issues a recall order.  If the 
company requests the hearing, the agencies should only require that the company stop 
distributing the suspect food product and notify others to cease its distribution.  The food 
product would not be recalled until the hearing is held.  The hearing would need to take 
place as soon as possible after the issuance of the order.185  Allowing for an extra couple 
of days for a hearing in the rare case of a dispute is a small delay compared to the 
protracted delays experienced in the Hudson Foods and ConAgra recalls.  
• Limiting Liability – Limiting the liability of food companies who comply 
with the government’s request for recall by giving them some immunity from civil 
actions may provide another incentive for compliance.  Food companies will already 
have limited their liability, however, by quickly and efficiently recalling unsafe food 
183 See Pesticides: Topical and Chemical Fact Sheets, United States Environmental Protection Agency, 
available at http:www.epa.gov/pesticides/factsheets/health_fs.htm (most pesticides registrants voluntarily 
recall substandard pesticide products); Kevin M. McDonald, Judicial Review of NHTSA-Ordered Recalls,
47 Wayne L. Rev. 1301, 1318 (Winter 2001/Spring 2002) (nearly all motor vehicle recalls are voluntary).
184
 Critics of mandatory recall authority have expressed concern that this authority would “present the 
opportunity for potential administrative abuse,” Hodges, supra note 96.  Testimony to the Senate 
Committee from the National Food Processors Association articulated concern that “[g]iving the Secretary 
of Agriculture the administrative power to mandate the recall of meat and poultry products, without judicial 
review, is an unwarranted expansion of government power.”  See MEAT INDUSTRY INTERNET NEWS 
SERVICE, supra note 11, at www.spcnet.com/mii/1997/971029.
185
 Both the FSEEA and SAFER Act proposals provided an informal hearing as to why the food product 
should not be recalled no later than two (2) business days after the issuance of the recall order.  See United 
States Department Of Agriculture, Press Release, supra note 121, available at 
http://www.usda.gov/news/releases/1997/08/0298. 
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products.186Also, it may be difficult justify giving food companies favorable treatment 
over non-food companies that timely and effectively recall unsafe products.
B. Benefits of Mandatory Recall Authority
Implementation of these powers and safeguards will benefit consumers and food 
companies.  These benefits range from increasing the effectiveness of food recalls to 
creating a more rational food recall system in the context of both domestic and 
international policy.
• Decreases Delay in Recalling Unsafe Food -- Mandatory notification and 
mandatory recall authority should speed up the recall process.187 The sooner USDA and 
FDA are notified of potentially contaminated food products, the quicker these agencies 
can protect American consumers.188  Also, the implicit threat that compels recalls under 
the voluntary recall system becomes a real and direct threat under a mandatory recall 
system.  In other words, mandatory recall gives the government additional leverage to 
engage companies in a quick and effective recall of unsafe food products.189  This 
186 See Packman, supra  note 51 at 438-39.
187 See United States Department of Agriculture, Press Release No. 0297.97, supra note 118, at available at 
http://www.usda.gov/news/releases/1997/08/0297.
188 See FOOD SAFETY AND INSPECTION SERVICE, BACKGROUNDER, THE SAFETY OF AMERICAN MEAT AND 
POULTRY (1997), available at http:www.usda.gov/news/releases/1997/10/0346.
189
 Former Secretary of Agriculture, Dan Glickman, stated:
We don’t have time for a protracted debate over how much
product should be recalled.  We don’t have time for a snail’s
pace procedure to stop a plant’s production until they clean
up their act.  One the experts make the determination that these
steps are necessary, we need to move quickly.  Every minute
we wait is another minute a person could become ill or worse.
That’s something that weighs very heavily on our minds every
time we deal with an outbreak.
Secretary Dan Glickman, Address at the USDA Headquarters, Aug. 29, 1997, available at
http://www.usda.gov/news/releases/1997/08/0298.
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leverage would avert the problem where a Hudson Foods or a ConAgra might agree to 
voluntarily recall their unsafe food product, but minimize the size of the initial recall.  A 
type of CPSC fast-track recall program would further accelerate recalls of unsafe food. 
• Provides Insurance Policy Against the “Bad Apple” Company – If for 
no other reason, mandatory recall authority is justified in its role as insurance against the 
occasional non-cooperative company.190  Voluntary recalls may work for the most part; 
however, there is always the possibility of a Hudson Foods or a ConAgra – a “bad apple” 
company -- that refuses or is unable to cooperate fully in the recall of its unsafe food 
product.  Mandatory recall authority is needed to equip the government with the requisite 
authority to force the non-compliant company to act without delay.
• Protects Against Terrorist Acts – Given the concern of bioterrorism
threats to the safety of food in the United States,191 it is sensible that the government 
agencies charged with the safety of the nation’s food supply – USDA and FDA – should 
have the authority to mandate the immediate recall of unsafe food.192
• Preserves Voluntary Recalls – As already noted in this article, it is likely 
that most companies will opt for voluntary recall, as do most companies who fall under 
the jurisdiction of the CPSC and other government agencies with authority to order a 
190 See United States Department of Agriculture, Press Release, supra note 121, available at 
http://www.usda.gov/news/releases/1997/08/0298.  See also FOOD SAFETY AND INSPECTION SERVICE,
supra note 188, available at http:www.usda.gov/news/releases/1997/10/0346.
191 See generally UNITED STATES GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, BIOTERRORISM, supra note 5. 
192 See Caroline Smith DeWaal, Statement at the National Food Policy Conference, Protecting the Public 
Under the New Bioterrorism Act, (May 9, 2003) (stating that although the new Bioterrorism Act grants new 
authorities to protect the American food supply, mandatory food recall authority is essential to dealing with 
potential terrorist threats against the food supply).
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recall of non-food products.193  If this is the case, mandatory recall will occur only in 
those rare instances where a company wants to contend with FDA or USDA or delay or 
refuse to meet a voluntary recall request.  This probable outcome means that the 
cooperative enforcement environment between government and private industry will 
continue.    
• Enhances Consumer Confidence in Food – An important function of an 
effective recall is to maintain consumer confidence in the United States food supply.  
Consumers are generally surprised to discover that the government does not have the 
authority to mandate the recall of unsafe food.194 Large-scale recalls that are mishandled 
by companies and government damage consumer confidence in the food supply.195  It is 
reasonable to believe that consumers will feel more assured in the safety of the United 
States food supply if government has the authority to mandate recall when a serious 
foodborne illness problem occurs.
• Aligns Incentives to Protect Consumers from Unsafe Food – The 
decision by a food company to engage in a purely voluntary recall is made when the 
193 See Cassie Orban, Student Note, The Product Recall Process: Mechanics and Shortcomings, 12 LOY. 
CONSUMER L. REV. 311, 320-21 (2000).
194
 Former Secretary of Agriculture, Dan Glickman stated:
I’ll tell you right now that I agree wholeheartedly with the 
consumer groups who feel that one of the biggest loopholes
out there is the fact that I do not have the authority to order 
a recall.  I would doubt that most Americans are even aware
of this.  I think that most folks would be shocked to know
that industry – and not federal food safety experts – ultimately
make the decision as to whether or not food is recalled when
the public’s safety is compromised.
United States Department of Agriculture, Press Release, Developments in Hudson Foods E Coli Outbreak 
(Aug. 21, 1997), available at http://www.usda.gov/news/releases/1997/08/0284.
195 See, e.g., Alan Hall, Recalls of Contaminated Food and New Foodborne Infections Have Shaken Faith 
in the Food Supply, SCI. AM., Nov. 3, 1997.
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expected costs of the recall are less than the costs of the implicit threat of liability, 
negative publicity, or regulatory action.196 This “costs” analysis does not involve, 
however, full consideration of the social costs – the harm to public health.197 Giving the
government the authority to mandate recalls will more fully allow government agencies 
to account for social costs and cause food companies to internalize these social costs 
when making safety decisions that effect the probability of recall.198
• Increases Scope and Depth of Recall – The development of traceability 
systems is enabling food companies to track product distribution and target recall 
activities.199 By giving the government mandatory recall coverage, the chances of 
removing unsafe food with the advent of new traceability systems from all levels of the 
food chain are increased considerably.
• Reduces Liability Exposure of Food Companies – Foodborne illnesses 
expose food companies to liability exposure under state product liability laws.200 Several 
law and consulting firms now specialize in foodborne illness lawsuits.201  Speeding up the 
recall process leads to less contaminated food consumed by consumers, which in turn 
196 See Michael R. Thompsen & Andrew M. McKenzie, Market Incentives for Safe Foods: An Examination 
of Shareholder Losses From Meat and Poultry Recalls, 82(3) AMER. J. AGR. ECON. 526, 536 (Aug. 2001).
197 See id.
198 See id.
199 ECONOMIC RESEARCH SERVICE, USDA BRIEFING ROOM, TRACEABILITY IN THE U.S. FOOD SUPPLY: 
MARKET INCENTIVES TO ESTABLISH TRACEABILITY, available at 
http:www.ers.usda.gov/Briefing/Traceability/marketincentives.htm.
200 See generally, JEAN C. BUZBY ET AL., UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE, REPORT NO. 
799, PRODUCT LIABILITY AND MICROBIAL FOODBORNE ILLNESS (April 2001).
201 See id. at 27.
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leads to a reduction of liability exposure for companies.202  When faced with the 
prospects of an unsafe food product, companies have a conflict of interest: they want to 
remove contaminated product from commerce while at the same time not taint their brand 
image.203  This dilemma may cause a company to engage in a recall, but one that is 
smaller and slower than is necessary to protect public health, such as the ConAgra recall.  
Mandatory recall authority helps remove the pressure of this conflict: the food company 
will be more compelled to act quickly and efficiently, thus lessening its liability 
exposure.204
• Standardizes Government’s Recall Policies – Mandatory food recall 
authority standardizes the government’s recall policies and practices, creating a more 
rational domestic public health network.  For example, it makes little sense to give the 
government the authority to order the recall of 125,000 detachable plugs on power 
adapters, as it did in 2003, where there were reported twelve plugs breaking open but no 
injuries 205and not the authority to order the recall of hamburger contaminated with
deadly E. coli 0157:H7 bacteria.
• Creates Food Recall Policy Consistent with International Trading 
Partners – Countries globally are intensifying their efforts to improve food safety in 
response to increasing food safety problems and consumer expectations.206  Mandatory 
202 See Packman, supra, note 51, at 438-39.
203 See Thompsen, supra, note 196, at 536.
204 See O’Reilly, supra , note 182, at 901-02.
205 See U.S. CONSUMER PROTECTION SAFETY COMMISSION, 2003 ANNUAL PERFORMANCE REPORT (Feb. 
2004), at 25.
206 WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION, FACT SHEET ON FOOD SAFETY AND FOODBORNE ILLNESS, NO. 237 
(January 2002), available at http://www.who.int/inf-fs/en/fact237.html.
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recall is an enforcement tool used by the major trading partners to the United States to 
ensure the removal of unsafe food products.207 Although this fact alone is not a 
compelling reason for mandatory food recall authority, it does suggest that the prevailing 
global view in an ever-increasing global food economy is that mandatory authority is 
imperative. 
• Positions USDA and FSIS as Public Health Agencies – FDA and FSIS 
within USDA are viewed as public health agencies.208  The credibility of FDA and FSIS 
in fulfilling this role depends on how well they protect public health.209  Having the 
ultimate authority to cause the removal of unsafe food in a timely and effective manner 
promotes the credibility of these agencies.210
207 See FSIS, BACKGROUNDER supra note 188, available at 
http:www.usda.gov/news/releases/1997/10/0346.  
208
 Due to the responsibilities of the USDA to market meat, the claim has been made that USDA is not by 
its nature a public health agency.  This observation is generally made in support of a single, separate 
regulatory food safety agency.  See Aparna Surendran, Meat Inspection Suffers Because Industry, 
Government at Odds, PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER, June 4, 2003, available at 
http:www.centredaily.com/mld/centredaily/news/6010859.htm (remarks by Carol Tucker Foreman, Head 
of the Consumer Federation of America).
209
 As stated by a USDA official, “recalls are a critical tool for us to carry out our public health mission.”  
FSIS Public Meeting, supra note 2, at 10.
210
 At the time of the GAO report of 2000, which criticized the recall process of USDA and FDA, the GAO 
reported USDA’s position that it needed mandatory recall authority to improve food safety and has 
supported proposed legislation.  GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 18, at 20. Dr. Catherine 
Woteki, former Undersecretary for Food Safety, stated that the USDA “believe that in order to truly protect 
the public health, USDA needs the authority to mandate a recall when voluntary efforts fail.”  Catherine 
Woteki, Address, Washington D.C. (Oct. 5, 1998), available at 
http://www.fsis.usda.gov/OA/speeches/1998/cw_recall.htm.  
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C. Single Agency to Administer Recalls
A recent GAO report criticizes the fragmented government agency approach to 
food safety.211  The report notes that food safety in the United States is governed by a 
complex system of thirty food safety laws, twelve federal agencies to administer these 
laws, and fifty interagency agreements to govern the combined food safety 
responsibilities of these twelve agencies.212  The report concludes that a single 
independent food safety agency is needed to improve the effectiveness and efficiency of 
the current food safety system.213
The report specifically criticizes the current dual agency responsibility over food 
recalls.214   The report finds that having both the FSIS and FDA involved in the recall of 
unsafe food is confusing and nonsensical in many cases.215The report notes that with the 
recent BSE-infected animal case found in Washington state, FSIS conducted a recall of 
meat distributed in markets in six states; however, had the meat been used, for example, 
in canned soups containing less than two percent meat, FDA, not FSIS, would have 
worked with the companies to recall these foods.216
211 See GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO-04-588T, FEDERAL FOOD SAFETY AND SECURITY SYSTEM: 
FUNDAMENTAL RESTRUCTURING IS NEEDED TO ADDRESS FRAGMENTATION AND OVERLAP (March 30, 
2004).  
212 Id. at 2.
213 Id. at 17-20.
214 Id. at 13-15.
215 Id. at 15.
216 Id.
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VI.
Conclusion
As stated by a USDA official in the aforementioned December 12, 2002 public 
meeting, “the time certainly is right to examine our recall process.”217  Both sides in the 
debate over whether the government should have the authority for the recall of unsafe 
food products share a common goal: unsafe food products should be removed from 
commerce effectively and quickly.  Both sides are far apart, however, in determining the 
appropriate role of government in the recall process.  Proponents of the current voluntary 
food recall system are quick to point to the past successes of recalling unsafe food from 
commerce, and express concern about government intrusion and overreach.  Proponents 
of a mandatory food recall system are quick to point to the past highly publicized failures 
of large-scale voluntary recalls and the disparate treatment of food products from non-
food products subject to mandatory recall authority.
Lost in the debate is how a mandatory recall system with the proper components 
and safeguards can be a sensible and minimalist approach to improving the current recall 
system that for the most part works fairly well.  Voluntary recalls would continue to be 
the norm, as government and the food industry would continue to work together to ensure 
that unsafe food is removed effectively and quickly from commerce.  The change would 
be the additional leverage given to government to compel a recall.  With a heightened 
sense of concern for food safety in an era of terrorist threats and the changing nature of 
food production and distribution, giving the government additional leverage to compel 
the recall of unsafe food products makes sense for the protection of consumers and for 
the well-being of the food industry.    
217
 FSIS Public Meeting, supra note 2, at 5.
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